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The "Pour-Over" Trust and the
Wills Statutes; Uneasy Bedfellows
By W. GAmiarr FLICaNGEm*
One of the most highly touted devices of modem estate plan-
ning is the so-called "pour-over" trust. Such a "trust" is nothing
more than a provision in the will which directs the disposition of
probate assets in accordance with the terms of an existing inter
vivos trust. Many valid reasons exist for the predilection in favor
of such use of an inter vivos trust as the focus for a unified estate
plan.' One primary advantage lies in the flexibility which can be
derived by employing a revocable, amendable inter vivos trust as
a vehicle for channeling changes in a testamentary scheme with-
out complying with all the technical formalities of a wills statute.
Perhaps it is this very aspect which has created the problems
encountered by the courts in their quest to determine the validity
of the "pour-over" provision. Certainly the least that can be said
is that jurists have had conceptual difficulties in approving such
provisions within the framework of a wills statute. It is the pur-
pose of this paper to trace these conceptual difficulties through
the vagaries of decisional law and academic theories in order to
suggest some comprehensive scheme for determining the permis-
sible scope of such provisions.
Since the pour-over trust is a provision in a will, any discus-
sion of the validity of such a trust depends upon a comprehension
of the social policy enunciated by the wills statutes. The basic
format of the wills statute is to require the testator to describe the
subjects, objects, and conditions of his testamentary bounty by
L Visiting Associate Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College ofLaw.
I See e.g., Casner, Estate Planning, 87-107 (2d ed. 1956); McClanahan, Be-
quests to an Existing Trust; Problems and Suggested Remedies, 47 Calif. L. Rev.
267 (1959); Shattuck, Some Practical Aspects of the Problems of the Alterable
and Revocable Inter Vivos Trust in Massachusetts, 26 B.U.L. Rev. 437 (1946);
Polasky, "Pour-Over" Wills and the Statutory Blessing, 98 Trusts & Estates 949(1959); Polasky, Pour-Over Wills: Used with Inter Vivos Trusts, 17 Sw. L.J.
410 (1968).
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means of a written document executed with certain formalities.
The purpose behind these requirements is to provide adequate
safeguards to prevent fraud and ensure the accurate fulfillment
of the testator's desires. Accordingly a pour-over provision, since
it fails to identify the beneficiaries of the property, does not
comply strictly with these requirements. However, there are two
basic wills doctrines, developed in other contexts, which permit
references to extrinsic facts or documents without violation of the
wills statutes. These two doctrines are generally referred to as
incorporation by reference and acts of independent significance.
The former refers only to, and requires only, an extrinsic written
document which is (1) in existence in fact prior to the execution
of the will, (2) referred to in the will as being in existence, (3)
properly identified in the will, and (4) intended to be incorpo-
rated.2 The second doctrine permits reference to extrinsic facts
having a basically non-testamentary aspect for the purpose of
identifying the beneficiaries intended or the property be-
queathed.' Both theories have been applied, with varying de-
grees of success, to the question of the validity of the pour-over
provision.
I. INCORPOIATION BY REx RNC,
Despite persistent urgings by text writers for the adoption of
the doctrine of acts of independent significance as the basic theory
in pour-over cases,4 the courts have analyzed the issue of validity
primarily in terms of incorporation by reference. Virtually exclu-
sive use of this doctrine has inevitably led to some rather
bizarre opinions, particularly with regard to pour-over provisions
referring to revocable, amendable inter vivos trusts.
As previously stated, incorporation by reference involves the
use of an extrinsic written document to identify the beneficiaries,
the property, or the terms and conditions of a testamentary gift.
The primary requisite for the use of this doctrine is that the
document referred to be in existence when the will is executed.
The doctrine has normally been applied to cover such items as
22 Bowe-Parker: Page on Wills § 19.18 (1960).
Id. at § 19.34; 1 Jarnan, Wills 123-28 (7th ed. 1930).
4 E.g., 1 Scott, Trusts § 54.3 (2d ed. 1956); Palmer, Testamentarj Disposi-
tions to the Trustee of an Inter Vivos Trust, 50 Mich. L. Rev. 33 (1951); Mc-
Clanahan, supra note 1; Shattuck, supra note 1.
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written memoranda, undelivered deeds, letters, etc.; written
documents which, though dispositive in form, have no legal
validity independent of the reference to them in the will. When
the reference, however, is to an inter vivos trust agreement, the
fact pattern changes. Such agreements have a legal validity
independent of the will and operate to govern the treatment and
disposition of the assets assigned to the trustee under the agree-
ment. Because of this difference in pattern, there has been an
occasional confusion in court opinions between the document,
which is the subject of the incorporation, and the trust itself,
which is the entity governed by the terms of that written docu-
ment. In one recent opinion,' for example, the Massachusetts
court held that an amendment to a trust could not be validly
incorporated by reference by means of a codicil executed sub-
sequent to the reduction to writing of the amendment. The terms
of the inter vivos trust required all amendments to be accepted by
the trustee before they became effective and the trustee had not
formally accepted the amendment until a few days after the
execution of the codicil. Therefore, the court reasoned that the
amendment was not in existence for purposes of incorporation by
reference at the time of the execution of the codicil. This would
seem to be a clear misapplication of the existence requirement
of incorporation by reference. A written document entitled
"amendment" was in existence at the time of execution of the
codicil. The fact that it had not yet become effective in regard to
the assets of the inter vivos trust is actually immaterial since the
doctrine does not require such independent legal effect. In a
similar case6 the Supreme Court of Arkansas correctly analyzed
the existence requirement vis-a-vis an inter vivos trust by approv-
ing a provision referring to a trust indenture which was not
executed until after the execution of the will. As the court
succinctly stated, "The requirement for incorporation by reference
is only that the extrinsic document be in existence, not signed,
and this fact is established by undisputed proof."7
Second Bank-State Street Trust Co. v. Pinion, 341 Mass. 366, 170 N.E.2d
350 (1960)- see also Clark v. Citizens Natl Bank of Collingwood, 8 N.J. Super.
69, 118 A.2d 108 (Ch. Div. 1955).
6 Montgomery v. Blankenship, 217 Ark. 357, 280 S.W.2d 51 (1950); see also
In re Brandenburg's Estate, 13 Wis. 2d 217, 108 N.W.2d 374 (1961); 1 Scott,
op. cit. supra note 4 (1964 Supp.), at 37-88 (referring to p. 379, n. 16).
7 Montgomery v. Blankenship, supra note 6 at -; 230 S.W.2d at 54.
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Existence of the written document then is the keynote to
incorporation by reference. Where the document postulated is an
irrevocable trust, existence in fact of the trust document prior to
execution of the will clearly satisfied this requirement. However,
where the trust indenture was revocable or amendable, such
existence in fact of the original indenture was not always deemed
sufficient. The theoretical stumbling block arose because of the
courts' failure to emphasize reference as opposed to incorporation.
There appeared to be a feeling that since the terms were phy-
sically incorporated into the will, the amending clause of the
inter vivos trust agreement would permit changes to the will by
documents which were neither in existence at the date of
execution of the will nor executed in accordance with the wills
statutes. Actually, with the exception of one English case," this
attitude never resulted in a decision adverse to the- validity of a
pour-over provision merely because it referred to a revocable,
amendable trust.
Two American decisions have been cited as authority for the
proposition that incorporation by reference cannot be used to
validate a pour-over to a revocable, amendable trust. Both cases,
however, are distinguishable. In Atwood v. Rhode Island Hos-
pital Trust Co.,10 the court specifically stated that incorporation
by reference was not at issue. The language in the will did not
refer to or identify any document and therefore failed to satisfy
the basic requirements for the use of the doctrine.:" The opinions
of both the majority and the dissent were directed at the issue
concerning use of acts of independent significance. Unfortu-
nately the language of the majority in referring to a written
document 2 has led more than one court to a belief that the
Atwood case was decided on the issue of incorporation by
8 In re Jones [1942] Ch. 828, 1 All E.R. 642; but compare, however, the later
cases of In re Edwards Will Trusts, [1948] Ch. 440, modifying [1947] 2 All E.R.
521 and Re Schnitz's Will Trusts, [1951] Ch. 870, [1951] 1 All E.R. 1095. See
also Comment, 57 Mich. L. Rev. 81, 82-83 (1958) for discussion of these three
cases.
9 Atwood v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co., 275 Fed. 513 (1st Cir. 1921);
President & Directors of Manhattan Co. v. Janowitz, 260 App. Div. 174, 21
N.Y.S.2d 232 (1940).
10 275 Fed. 518 (lst Cir. 1921).
11Id. at 520, 525; Comment, 89 Va. L. Rev. 817 (1953).
'.2 Judge Anderson, speaking for the majority, said, "Manifestly, then, the real
disposition of this residuary estate is made, not by the will, but by the shifting
provisions in the trust instrument." 275 Fed. at 521,
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reference. 3 In Janowitz v. Board of Directors of the Manhattan
Co.,14 there is indeed language tending to deny the use of the
doctrine with an amendable trust. However, there were in fact
both pre-execution and post-execution amendments to the agree-
ment and the primary issue was directed toward the effect of
these amendments on the validity of the pour-over provision.
Suffice it to say that today it seems clear that a revocable,
amendable inter vivos trust which has not been amended can
be incorporated by reference by means of a pour-over provision.15
Once this initial barrier was eliminated, the next issue that
arose concerned the amendments actually made to the trust.
Could those amendments be included within the pour-over
provision so as to affect the disposition of the probate assets
covered by such provision? If not, would such denial necessarily
invalidate the whole pour-over provision?
Two methods were soon designed to provide an affimative
answer to the first question. First, any amendment to the trust
agreement which was executed prior to the execution of the will
(or the last codicil thereto) could validly be incorporated by
reference within the coverage of the pour-over provision. 6 Sec-
ondly, any amendment executed after the will, while not subject
to inclusion under incorporation by reference, could still be given
effect as to the probate assets if such amendment was executed in
compliance with the formalities of the wills statute.'7 So long
as such amendment was in writing, signed by the testator, wit-
nessed and attested in accordance with the wills statute, it could
be treated as a codicil. While no theoretical problem is presented
by the first method, it is indeed strange to see the courts which
generally struggle with the problem of whether or not a written
document which is non-testamentary in form can be regarded as
13 E.g., Montgomery v. Blankenship, 217 Ark. 857, 280 S.W.2d 51 (1950);
Stouse v. First Nat I Bank, 245 S.W.2d 914 (Ky. 1951).
'4260 App. Div. 174, 21 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1940).
I1 Montgomery v. Blankenship, 217 Ark. 357, 280 S.W.2d 51 (1950); Stouse
v. First Nat'l Bank, 245 S.W.2d 914 (Ky. 1951); State ex rel. Citizens Nat'l Bank
v. Superior Ct., 236 Ind. 135, 138 N.E.2d 900 (1956); Old Colony Trust Co. v.
Cleveland, 291 Mass. 380, 196 N.E. 920 (1935); Bolles v. Toledo Trust Co., 144
Ohio St. 195, 58 N.E.2d 881 (1944); Re Schnitz's Will Trusts, [1951] Ch. 870,
[1951] 1 All E.R. 1095.
16 Forsythe v. Spielberger, 86 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 1956); First-Central Trust Co.
v. Claflin, 73 N.E.2d 388 (Ohio C.P. 1947).
17 Forsythe v. Spielberger, supra note 16; Stouse v. First Nat'l Bank, 245
S.W.2d 914 (Ky. 1951); Merrill v. Boal, 47 R.I. 274, 182 AUt. 721 (1926).
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a will,'8 approve as a codicil a trust amendment which by its
terms contains no animus testandi. The Rhode Island court,
when faced with a similar situation, 9 frankly admitted the
problem but said:
A person may act animo testandi without knowing that he
is making a will and it is immaterial what kind of instrument
he thinks he is making if only he manifests a clear intent to
dispose of his property after his decease and observes the
statutory formalities .... 20
Not only were these two methods for saving the problem
accepted, but the courts were also quick to seize upon a further
solution which permitted them, as a practical matter, to give
effect to the amendment without regard to the issue of validity.
Since the amendments were valid insofar as the inter vivos trust
was concerned,2' they could be satisfied from the corpus of the
inter vivos trust. Whenever this was factually possible, the
courts, while admitting that the amendments could not be
included within the pour-over provision, nevertheless gave effect
to the pour-over provision by ignoring the amendments.2 As a
result they were able to avoid the second question presented
above.
When the amendment was neither executed in accordance
with the formalities required of the wills statute, nor in existence
on the date of the execution of the will, and when the terms of
the amendment either specifically referred to probate assets, or
necessarily affected them, the pour-over provision could not
validly include such amendments.23 If then the pour-over pro-
vision is invalid insofar as it attempts to incorporate certain
amendments thereto, is the whole provision invalid? There
'
8 E.g., Nobles v. Fickes, 230 M11. 594, 82 N.E. 950 (1907); see generally
Atkinson, Wills § 43, at 189, § 47 (2d ed. 1953); 1 Bowe-Parker: Page on Wills
§ 6.2 (1960).
19 Merrill v. Boal, 47 R.I. 274, 132 Ati. 721 (1926).201d. at -, 132 At. at 725.
t21 Assuming the requirements of the trust agreement itself were complied
with.
22 Koeninger v. Toledo Trust Co., 49 Ohio App. 490, 197 N.E. 419 (1934);
cf. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Cleveland, 291 Mass. 880, 196 N.E. 920 (1935)[where the court's decision is based on the proposition that the testator did not
intend to incorporate any subsequent amendments to the trust].23 Forsythe v. Spielberger, 86 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 1956); Stouse v. First Nat1
Bank, 245 S.W.2d 914 (Ky. 1951); Old Colony Trust Co. v. Cleveland, supra
note 22; Koeninger v. Toledo Trust Co., supra note 22.
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appears to be agreement that the answer to this question must
depend upon the testator's intent.24 The difficulty is that the
question does not involve a problem of interpretation, (i.e., a
decision as to what the testator intended by the words he used)
but rather a question of construction, (i.e., a determination of the
testator's intent covering a situation which he did not envisage).
Like all problems of construction the result always involves an
element of rationalization by the court; therefore the conceptual
results are anything but satisfying. Two answers have been
offered. The first of these would rule the whole provision invalid.
Since the testator intended the probate assets to be distributed in
accordance with the terms of the trust as it existed at the time of
his death, his intent cannot be given effect unless all amendments
can be included. Having postulated that they could not, the
whole provision must fail. This was the view adopted by Profes-
sor Scott in the first edition of his treatise on trusts.25 Other
writers,"- however, argued that since the frequent result of such a
decision is intestacy, the testator's basic intent to die testate
should overcome his specific intent to include all amendments.
Accordingly, they urged that the provision be given effect as to
the basic instrument together with all amendments which could
be validly included in accordance with the preceeding discus-
sion. Professor Scott himself adopted this view in the second
edition of his treatise.
Both views have merit, but both involve purely mechanical
decisions as to the testator's intent. If the desire is truly to
determine the testator's intent, then an analysis must be made in
accordance with the facts and circumstances surrounding the
execution of the will, the codicils, the trust agreement and all
amendments thereto, so as to determine his probable decision
had he been aware that the trust amendments could not validly
affect his probate assets. Such an analysis would require investiga-
tion as to the scope and nature of the changes effected in his
24Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co. v. Superior Ct., 32 Cal. 2d 1, 193
P.2d 721 (1948); St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Blue, 353 S.W.2d 770 (Mo. 1962);
In re York's Estate 95 N.H 435, 65 A.2d 282 (1949); Re Leonard, [1943]
1 D.L.R. 541 (19365; 1 Scott, op. cit. supra note 4; Palmer, supra note 4; Polasky,
supra note 1.
25 1 Scott, Trusts § 54.3 at 299 (1st ed. 1939).2 0E.g., Palmer, supra note 4.
27 1 Scott, Trusts § 54.3 at 377 (2d ed. 1956).
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general testamentary scheme by the ineffective amendments as
well as an inquiry into those persons who would take by intestacy
as opposed to those who would take under the terms of the trust
as they existed prior to the ineffective amendments. Such an
analysis is admittedly never completely satisfactory, but it appears
at least to be more rational than to adopt a straight "yes or no"
answer based on a theory of probable intent derived in a
vacuum.
28
The final problem with regard to the issue of validity through
the use of incorporation by reference arises when the inter vivos
trust referred to in the pour-over provision has been revoked by
the testator prior to his death. Since incorporation by reference
is concerned with a written document rather than with an
operating fact or entity, it is not surprising to see that in the
only appellate court decision on this issue it was held that the
revocation was ineffective to affect the distribution of the probate
assets.29 Even though the inter vivos trust no longer existed as an
entity, the document which governed the trust would determine
the distribution of the probate assets.
II. AcTs oF INDFPENDiENT SwNimicANCE
The genesis of acts of independent significance as a method
of validating "pour-over trusts" began with the recognition of the
inadequacies of incorporation by reference. Its growth, however,
while scholastically phenomenal, was judicially retarded.30 Al-
though expressions of approval were occasionally made,31 it was
not until 1960 that the accolade of judicial legitimacy was con-
ferred specifically by a high court.32 This delay can be traced
directly to the conceptual difficulties incurred in attempting to
fit the inter vivos trust into the category of an act of independent
significance.
28 Compare such test for example with dependent relative revocation and its
dichotomy of mechanical vs. intent tests.
29 Fifth-Third Union Trust Co. v. Wilensky, 79 Ohio App. 73, 70 N.E.2d 920
(1946); see also Marshall v. Northern Trust Co., 22 Ill. 2d 391, 176 N.E.2d 807
(1961).3SoTwo cases actually ruled against use of the doctrine: Atwood v. Rhode
Island Hospital Trust Co., 275 Fed. 513 (1st Cir. 1921); Boal v. Metropolitan
Museum of Art, 298 Fed. 894 (2d Cir. 1924).3 1 E.g., Stouse v. First Nat'l Bank, 245 S.W.2d 914 (Ky. 1951); In re Yorks
Estate, 95 N.H. 435, 65 A.2d 282 (1949).
32 Second Bank-State Street Trust Co. v. Pinion, 341 Mass. 866, 170 N.E.2d
350 (1960).
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The crux of the problem in any attempt to employ the
doctrine of acts of independent significance lies in the issue as to
the "non-testamentary aspect" of the extrinsic fact which com-
pletes the identification of the object or subject. The essence of
the requirement of "non-testamentary aspect" is nothing more
than a recognition of the ancient maxim that a testator cannot by
his will create a power in either himself or another to dispose of
his property without complying with the formalities of a wills
statute. Where the extrinsic fact is subject to manipulation by
the testator, or a named third person, for the primary purpose of
selecting the beneficiary or property, the maxim is violated and
the extrinsic fact lacks the necessary "non-testamentary aspect."
Thus the issue of "non-testamentary aspect" arises when the
extrinsic fact is an event or occurrence which is to take place
after the will is executed. Although the extrinsic event itself will
occur after the execution of the will, the "non-testamentary" aspect
of the event must be decided as of the date of the execution of
the will. In each case then the event must be analyzed to de-
termine whether or not the testator, on the date of execution,
would have been inclined to control the occurrence or event for
testamentary purposes. The mere fact of control per se does not
make the event testamentary;33 so long as the exercise of the
control has primary significance independent of the testimentary
dispositions, the maxim and the doctrine, and therefore the pur-
pose of the wills statute, is satisfied. In fact, the cases and writers
all seem to presuppose that the testator's factual control over
the event is immaterial;34 only the probabilities of control are im-
portant, and they can be tested only by reference to the time
of execution of the will.
With such considerations in mind then the courts have de-
signated certain events as having that necessary independent sig-
nificance. The typical examples are: hiring of employees (for
gifts to "those in my employ at the time of my death") ;35 entering
into partnerships (for gifts to "those in partnership with me at
the time of my death"); 3° and renting safe deposit boxes (for
3 3 Atkinson, Wills § 81 (2d ed. 1953); 2 Bowe-Parker: Page on Wills § 19.34
(1960); 1 Scott, Trusts § 54.3 (2d ed. 1956).34 Atkinson, Wills 395 (2d ed. 1953); Evans, Nontestamentary Acts and In-
corporation by Reference, 16 U. Chi. L. Rev. 635 (1949).3r E.g., Metcalf v. Sweeney, 17 R.I. 213, 21 AUt. 364 (1891).3 0 E.g., Stubbs v. Sargon, 3 Myl & C. 507, 40 Eng. Rep. 1022 (1838).
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gifts of "the content of my safe deposit box") .37 In each case it
is possible for the testator to use the event for the purpose of
designating his testamentary bounty, but because each such event
is of "a business nature and has reason for its existence apart
from any disposition of the property under the will,"38 it is
probable that the testator would use it primarily for such non-
testamentary purposes. Accordingly, the possible use is subjected
to the probable use in light of the independent aspect of the event.
Where the doctrine is applied to the "pour-over trust" situa-
tion, the extrinsic fact becomes the inter vivos trust. Accordingly,
the basic conceptual difficulty lies in categorizing such a trust
as primarily non-testamentary in terms of the probabilities of its
use where the trust was created by the testator.39 If the trust is
both irrevocable and extant when the will is executed, there is in
fact no control left in the testator; the trust is as complete and
final as a past event. Such a trust raises no issue as to possible
testamentary use and should therefore involve a proper applica-
tion of the doctrine. No such neat solution, however, can solve
the problem created by the revocable, amendable trust regardless
of whether it is amended or not.40 The control retained by the
settlor-testator is absolute and his exercise of that control is
predicated solely on his basic donative desires. Such donative
desires are also primarily testamentary in the broad sense; the
major beneficial interests in the trust are scheduled to take
effect in possession after the settlor's death. Accordingly, any
idea of independence seems somewhat amorphous. There is very
little check on the testator's use of the extrinsic act solely for the
purpose of regulating his testamentary bounty free from the
formal restrictions of the wills statute. The settlor can change
37 E.g., Gaff v. Cornwallis, 219 Mass. 226, 106 N.E. 860 (1914).
38 Atwood v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co., 275 Fed. 513, 528 (1st Cir.
1921) (dissenting opinion of Judge Bingham).39 This paper will not be concerned with the relatively rare case of a pour-
over to a trust created by another. Although much of the discussion of the settlor-
testator situation is applicable to such a case, there are sufficient variations and
variables to require separate treatment. See generally 1 Scott, Trusts § 54.4
(2d ed. 1956).40 Since we are concerned with the probabilities of use of the extrinsic fact
under the doctrine rather than with the actual use, it is immaterial whether the
trust is in fact amended. If, however, the extrinsic fact (i.e., the trust fund) is not
in existence (i.e., is revoked) at the testator's death, the bequest fails because
there is no fact to complete the necessary identification. Thus even though the
time of testing for probability of use is the date of execution of the will, once
the fact is regarded as "non-testamentary" it is referred to as of the testators
death for purposes of completing the bequest.
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the identity of the recipient or object of a testamentary gift by
unilaterally amending his inter vivos trust. To classify the settlor's
probable use of his control over such a trust as independent or
non-testamentary would appear to be somewhat facetious. In
fact, it is difficult indeed to envisage any change in the terms of
such a trust except as a reflection of the settlor-testator's altered
attitudes regarding the devolution of his property on his death.
The probability of use of the extrinsic fact to make changes in
the testamentary plan is of an extremely high order. Under such
an analysis of acts of independent significance, the doctrine
should be considered inappropriate and inapplicable to the re-
vocable, amendable trust.41
Despite the above many scholars and judges have argued and
apparently still argue that the doctrine not only can be employed
but appropriately should be employed to validate pour-over
provisions to revocable, amendable trusts.4' The basic approaches
appear to be; 1) the creation of such a trust is itself an act of
independent significance, or, 2) so long as the value of the corpus
of such a trust is more than purely nominal, any amendments
would have the necessary independence in connection with their
affect on the assets of the trust. There can be little doubt today
but that such a trust has sufficient independent legal existence
to escape the rigors of the wills statutes with regard to the assets
conveyed to the trustee under the agreement.43 In fact, under the
41 It is interesting to note that acts of independent significance has apparently
never been used in England in connection with a pour-over. (See Evans, supra
note 34 and cf. Re Schnitz's Will Trusts, [1951] 1 Ch. 870 [1951] 1 All. E. R.
1095; In re Whitburn, [1923] 1 Ch. 332.) It is probable that the reason lies in
the greater care used by English lawyers in following the requirements of incorpo-
ration by reference and in the acceptance by the English courts of the "secret
trust" (Blackwell v. Blackwell, [1929] A.C. 318, 67 A.L.R. 336). One of the
basic requirements for the validity of a "secret trust," however, is that the trustee
named in the will must have been notified of the terms and conditions of the
trust prior to the execution of the will. [2 Jarman, Wills 884 (7th ed. 1930).]
Accordingly while a revocable, amendable trust agreement could govern such a
"secret trust," no later amendments could affect the probate assets without re-
execution of the will (or execution of a codicil) after notification of the terms of
the amendment to the trustee. (Cf. In re Colin Cooper, [1939] Ch. 811, aflirming
[1939] Ch. 580.)
42 1 Scott, Trusts § 54.3 (2d ed. 1956); Restatement, Trusts 2d § 54;
McClanahan, supra note 1; Palmer, supra note 4; Note, Mich. L. Rev. 1276
(1961), but cf. Lauritzen, Can a Revocable Trust be Incorporated by Reference,
45 IM. L. Rev. 583 (1950); Shattuck, supra note 1; Evans, supra note 34.4 3 National Shawmut Bank v. Joy, 315 Mass. 457, 53 N.E.2d 113 (1944);
Rose v. Rose, 300 Mich. 73, 1 N.W.2d 458 (1942); Central Trust Co. v. Watt, 139
Ohio St. 50, 38 N.E.2d 185 (1941); see generally 1 Scott, Trusts § 57.2 (2d ed.
1956); Annot., 34 A.L.R.2d 1270 (1954).
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prevailing doctrines the settlor can retain all the incidences of
ownership in the trust assets except title and the right to
immediate possession." So long as the form of the transaction
between the transferor and transferee is that of a trust agreement,
the transaction is an inter vivos one and the assets so transferred
are removed from the aegis of the wills statute.45
The term "non-testamentary" as used in the doctrine of acts
of independent significance, however, cannot be equated with
"non-testamentary" meaning "inter vivos." In its latter connota-
tion the term simply refers to the time of transfer of title to
property while as used in the doctrine it embodies an issue as to
the probabilities of use of an extrinsic fact to determine the
object or subject of an admittedly "testamentary" gift. Thus while
it is possible to argue effectively that the control retained by the
trustor of such a trust does not adversely affect the fact that title
and possession to the assets thereof have been transferred inter
vivos, it by no means follows ipso facto that the exercise of such
control will probably be independent of the trustor's testamentary
plan. On the contrary, such a trust admittedly offers a sub-
stitute for testamentary disposition.4  Accordingly, the mere
creation of such a trust cannot be regarded as having "non-
testamentary" significance within the meaning of the doctrine of
acts of independent significance.
Professor Scott, the leading exponent of the use of the doctrine
in these cases, argues that the test of independence lies not in the
control retained by the testator but in the significance of the
extrinsic fact apart from the disposition of the probate assets.
Accordingly, he admits that a trust purely nominal in value
would lack such significance.48 In other words, if the value of
the trust estate is too small, the testator-settlor is most likely to
44 Atlantic Nat'l Bank v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 357 Mo. 770, 211 S.W.2d
2 (1948); and even these can be retained where the so-called "Totten Trust" is
permitted. Matter of Totten, 179 N.Y. 112, 71 N.E. 748 (1904); contra, Estate
of Hoffman, 195 N.E.2d 106 (Ohio 1963).
45 Unless conflict arises between such formalism and public policy considera-
tions like the widow's rights-e.g., Newman v. Dore, 275 N.Y. 871, 9 N.E.2d 966
(1937); In re Husted's Est., 403 Pa. 485, 169 A.2d 57 (1961); see generally 1
Scott, Trusts § 57.5 (2d ed. 1956).
46 Prof. Atkinson categorizes such trusts as "Will Substitutes," Atkinson, Wills
§ 42 (2d ed. 1953); cf. 1 Scott, Trusts §§ 57.1-57.3 (2d ed. 1956).
47 1 Scott, Trusts § 54.3, at 377 (2d ed. 1956).
48 Id. at 379-80; Scott, Trusts and the Statute of Wills, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 521
(1930).
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exercise his control over the trust in order to change the devolu-
tion of the pour-over assets rather than for the independent
purpose of determining the ultimate disposition of the trust assets.
Therefore it is submitted that Professor Scott's "significance"
test is essentially identical with the probabilities of use test sug-
gested above. Unlike this writer, however, Professor Scott would
consider a substantial trust as lacking that probability of improper
use because any exercise of control over such a trust involves a
change in the disposition of the substantial assets contained in
the trust itself.
This dichotomy of substantial vs. nominal is subject to two
objections. In the first instance is the practical problem offered
by the use of such terms. Substantial or nominal in comparison
to what? Do the terms refer to some absolute or do they involve
a comparison of the trust assets vis-a'-vis the pour-over assets?
If the former, then what value must the trust have to qualify?
If the latter, then what is the proportional relationship necessary
to sustain a finding of substantiality for the inter vivos trust?
The Maine court in Canal Nat'l Bank v. Chapman,49 in categoriz-
ing the inter vivos trust as "substantial," made careful reference
to the fact that the inter vivos trust had a value of $120,000 as
compared with a probate estate of $93,000. Does this signify
that the trust estate must be larger than the probate estate?
Furthermore, is the independence of the extrinsic fact (the trust)
now to be determined as of the date of death of the testator-
settlor? Even more important than the practical problems raised
by this comparison test is the theoretical one previously postulated
concerning the basic drives of the testator-settlor in altering the
dispositive provisions of the trust. Regardless of the size of such
a trust the settlor will regard it as primarily an instrument for
effectuating his testamentary plans. There is no justification for
believing that in amending the trust the settlor is not in fact
thinking in terms of the disposition of his property on his death;
his exercise of control then is directly linked to his testamentary
desires.
Regrettably, two courts have officially adopted and applied
the doctrine to revocable, amendable trusts. In Second Bank-
49 157 Me. 309, 171 A.2d 919 (1961).
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State Street Trust Co. v. Pinion,50 the Massachusetts court, after
unnecessarily garbling incorporation by reference,5 upheld the
pour-over device under acts of independent significance for five
reasons: 1) Professor Scott and the Restatement, Trusts 2nd
approved it, 2) the creation of the trust was itself a fact of inde-
pendent significance, 3) the pour-over device was important to
modem estate planning, 4) 18 states had enacted statutes author-
izing some form of pour-over, and 5) he formalities of execution
of the trust agreement and the solemnity surrounding the transfer
satisfy the basic purposes of the wills statute. The Maine court in
the Chapman case 52 reached the same conclusion but on the basis
that the trust had been an operating existing entity of a sub-
stantial size 53 and such active "independenf' life satisfied the
criteria for use of the doctrine.
This writer's objection to the use of this doctrine in such
cases has developed progressively from a mild irritation to a
severe itch because of two essentially pragmatic factors. The
first of these lies in the ease with which amendments to such
trusts can be made. Ordinarily no witnesses are required to such
amendments. The trust agreement together with its amendments
seldom sees the light of public scrutiny. In fact since the doctrine
has reference to trust entity rather than the trust agreement, the
trust could as easily be an oral one, amendable by telephone
call. Under such conditions the stage is set for fraud, undue
influence, mental incompetency and even forgery. More im-
portantly, however, the ease of amending, lacking as it does the
solemnity attendant on all will or codicil executions, frequently
destroys the need for contemplation before initiating changes in
testamentary plans. In short, the use of the doctrine opens the
door to those very ills which the wills statutes sought to contain.
The second objection springs from the confusion which
advocacy of the doctrine has raised in the area of administering
the pour-over assets. Both incorporation by reference and acts
of independent significance are concerned solely with the issue
of the validity of the pour-over provision. They were not designed
50 341 Mass. 366, 170 N.E.2d 350 (1960).
51 See discussions supra p. 733 and infra p. 746.
52 Cal Nat'1 Bank v. hapman, 157 Me. 309, 171 A.2d 919 (1961).
53 T trust had existed and operated for over ten years according to the
data supplied by the court.
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to govern the issue as to whether the testator intended to
establish a separate testamentary trust or merely add probate
assets to the corpus of the inter vivos trust. The very term "pour-
over" is indicative of the testator's obvious desires on this point;
he expects the assets to be added to the inter vivos trust and
administered as a part thereof. Despite this, however, many
courts, influenced by the arguments in favor of acts of independ-
ent significance as opposed to incorporation by reference, took
the position that the former alone permitted the assets to be
added to the corpus of the existing trust;54 incorporation by
reference was regarded as requiring the creation of a separate
testamentary trust.55 It is submitted that while there is un-
doubtedly a certain logic in so distinguishing the application of
the two doctrines, they were never intended for such a purpose,
and to insist upon such purpose will frequently violate the
testator's intention.
The primary confusion occurs in relation to the doctrine of
incorporation by reference as it is applied to the pour-over
provision. This doctrine is no more than a label given to the
process by which courts permit the identification of beneficiaries
and/or bequests by reference to an extrinsic document, in this
case the trust indenture. The testator's intent to identify the
beneficiaries by referring to the indenture, however, is not neces-
sarily equated with any intent to physically incorporate the words
of the indenture into the body of the will. Reference, rather than
incorporation, is the keynote of this doctrine.56 It is in this respect
that incorporation by reference differs from integration, where
every written paper must be presented for probate as a part of the
54 Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co. v. Superior Ct., 32 Cal. 2d 1, 193
P.2d 721 (1948); Estate of Willey, 128 Cal. 1, 60 Pac. 471 (1900); In re York's
Estate, 95 N.H. 435, 65 A.2d 282 (1949); 2 Bowe-Parker: Page on Wills § 19.28
at 109-10 (1960).
55 Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co. v. Superior Ct., supra note 54; St.
Louis Union Trust Co. v. Blue, 353 S.W.2d 770 (Mo. 1962); 2 Bowe-Parker:
Page on Wills § 19.28 (1960); but cf. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Cleveland, 291
Mass. 380, 196 N.E. 920 (1935); Linney v. The Cleveland Trust Co., 30 Ohio
App. 345, 165 N.E. 101 (1928); In re Playfair, [1951] Ch. 4; contra, Re Leonard,
[1943] 1 D.L.R. 541 (1936); State ex rel. Citizens Natl Bank v. Superior Ct., 236
Ind. 135, 138 N.E.2d 900 (1956); 1 Scott, Trusts § 54.3 at 382-84 (2d ed. 1956).
(19556 Cf. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Cleveland, 291 Mass. 80, 196 N.E. 920(35); Re Leonard, [1943] 1 D.L.R. 541 (1936); In re Edwards' Will Trusts
[1948] Chi. 440, modifying [1947] 2 All E.R. 521; Re SchnitZs Will Trusts
[1951] Ch. 8702 [1951] 1 All E.R. 1095.
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whole will. 7 Failure to recognize this vital distinction between
the two doctrines has led many courts astray.
Once mired in the error of believing that incorporation by
reference automatically involves physical integration of the ex-
trinsic trust document into the will, the courts have had difficulty
in extricating themselves from the natural conclusion that the use
of incorporation by reference to validate a pour-over provision
leads ipso facto to the creation of a separate testamentary trust.
So pervasive has this error become that one court recently implied
that incorporation by reference would require the physical inte-
gration not only of the terms of the extrinsic inter vivos agreement
but of any funds governed by that agreement as well.5 8 This mis-
conception has increased the pressure on the courts to apply the
doctrine of acts of independent significance to the question of
validity in order to effectuate the testator's intent to add the
probate funds to the inter vivos trust.
Not only have issues of administration been decided by the
use of doctrines governing validity but issues of validity have
similarly been affected by expressions of intent by the testator
regarding administration. Thus the Massachusetts court in the
Pinion case59 ruled out the use of the doctrine of incorporation by
reference on the issue of validity because of the testator's express
direction in the will that the funds governed by the pour-over
provision were to be added to the inter vivos trust and ad-
ministered as a part of its corpus. The court held that such an
expressed desire destroyed any intent to incorporate the trust
agreement. The Maine court in the Chapman case60 arrived at
the same conclusion in the course of its opinion. The intent to
incorporate under incorporation by reference is merely an intent
to refer to the extrinsic document for identification of beneficiaries
and/or the subject matter of a gift and therefore has independent
bearing from the intent as to administration. Therefore it was
error for either court to equate these two intents.
57 So under incorporation by reference it is not necessary to admit such
documents to probate-2 Bowe-Parker: Page on Wills § 19.32 at 117 (1960); 1
Jarman, 'Wills p. 126-28 (7th ed. 1930).58 1In -re Steck's Will, 275 Wis. 290, 81 N.W.2d 729 (1957).
59 SeodBank-State Street Trust Co. v. Pinion, 341 Mass. 366, 170 N.E.2J
350 (1960).
60 Canal Nat'l Bank v. Chapman, 157 Me. 309, 171 A.2d 919 (1961).
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CONCLUSION
In view of the inadequacies of incorporation by reference and
the dangers, both theoretical and practical, in the use of acts of
independent significance, is the pour-over provision to be aban-
doned? The answer is an emphatic no! It is a most useful device
and offers many advantages besides that of evading the wills
statutes. As such it should be retained, but its use should not
require being straitjacketed by pre-existing doctrines which are
not truly applicable; nor should those doctrines in turn be
stretched and strained to cover the pour-over to the revocable,
amendable trust. For this reason some 81 states have enacted
some form of legislation specifically covering the pour-over to
such a trust as a matter of statutory fiat.6 ' While the wisdom of
such legislation is debatable, its use precludes the necessity of
reference of either of the two doctrines discussed above.
New York and New Jersey, however, have perhaps best
achieved by judicial means the proper balance between the
utility of the pour-over device and the danger of its misuse.
Both jurisdictions had decided that incorporation by reference
could not properly be used for any purpose within the context
of the wills statute.0 Accordingly, when the first pour-over cases
reached the courts the contestants argued that the pour-over pro-
vision was an attempted incorporation by reference and therefore
void. Justice Cardozo, 3 in his usual inimitable fashion, replied
that the rule against incorporation should not be carried to its
"drily logical extreme"64 and accordingly upheld the pour-over
on the basis that the opportunities for fraud and chicanery were
totally absent in the case of an irrevocable pre-existing written
trust. Since the purpose of the wills statute therefore was not
violated, the pour-over clause was valid. It is submitted that
Cardozo was neither approving incorporation by reference nor
adopting acts of independent significance, but rather stating a
general philosophy of examining each case to determine its result
61 According to the 1963 tabulation made by Leon Schaeffler, Esq. for the
Editorial and Research Committee of the American College of Probate Council
published in 102 Trusts & Estates 265 (1963).
62 Murray v. Lewis, 94 N.J. Eq. 681, 121 Atl. 525 (1923); Booth v. Baptist
Church of Christ, 126 N.Y. 215, 28 N.E. 288 (891); but cf. 2 Bowe-Parker: Page
on Wills §§ 19.21 and 19.22 (1960).63 In his opinion in Matter of Rausch, 258 N.Y. 327, 179 N.E. 755 (1932).
641d. at -, 179 N.E. at 756.
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vis-h-vis the purpose of the wills statute. 5 On such an ad hoc
basis can Matter of Fowles66 and Matter of Ivie67 be justified.
On such basis can President and Directors of Manhattan Bank v.
Janowitz" be reconciled. In each case the court examined the
facts surrounding the use of the extrinsic trust agreement as it
affected the probate assets. The examination was made as of the
testator's date of death in order to decide whether there was in
fact that opportunity for fraud and chicanery which led initially
to the refusal to recognize incorporation by reference. While the
pattern is not as clear in New Jersey it is submitted that its
decisions too can be so structured.69
While such a "purpose" test lacks that absolute predictability
afforded by an approval of incorporation by reference or acts of
independent significance, it does provide a theory which can be
justified within the context of the wills statutes. It also provides a
test specifically designed for the pour-over problem. Under such
a test a pour-over to a charitable foundation,7" to an irrevocable
trust,71 to a revocable, amendable trust which was never amended
in terms of its dispositive aspects, 72 or to certain trusts created by
third persons,7 3 would be valid. Conversely, however, a pour-over
65 Cardozo specifically denied any general application for incorporation by
reference and, by specifically hypothecating as invalid a pour-over to an oral trust,
simlarly, denied any use of acts of independent significance. In fact Cardozo
states, 'Much will depend upon the extent to which the door is likely to be opened
to chicanery or mistake if there is relaxation of the requirement of a self-suffcient
integration. Id. at -, 179 N.E. at 757.66 222 N.Y. 222, 118 N.E. 611 (1918), where neither incorporation by refer-
ence nor acts of independent significance were technically available. See 1 Scott,
Trusts § 54.4 at 389 (2d ed. 1956).
67 4 N.Y.2d 178, 149 N.E.2d 725, 173 N.Y.S.2d 293 (1958), where incorpora-
tion by reference is clearly inapplicable.
68260 App. Div. 174, 21 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1940), where acts of independent
significance would be available under the prevailing views of Prof. Scott et al.69 Clark v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 38 N.J. Super. 69, 118 A.2d 108 (Ch. Div.
1955), where incorporation by reference was appropriate since the trust agreement
was in existence; Swetland v. Swetland, 102 N.J. Eq. 294, 140 Atl. 279 (E. & A.
1928), affirming 100 N.J. Eq. 196, 134 Atl. 822 (1926). See Brinckerhoff, In-
corporation by Reference and Acts of Independent Significance in New Jersey and
New York, 60 N.J.L.J. 97, 105, 113 (1937).
70 Matter of Weber, 22 Misc. 2d 290, 195 N.Y.S.2d 337 (1959); In re Gug-
genheims Estate, 168 Misc. 1, 5 N.Y.S.2d 137 (1938); In re Tiffany's Est., 157
Misc. 873, 285 N.Y. Supp. 971 (1935).
1 Matter of Rausch, 258 N.Y. 327, 179 N.E. 755 (1932).72 Swetland v. Swetland, 102 N.J. Eq. 294, 140 At. 279 (E. & A. 1928),
affirming 100 N.J. Eq. 196, 134 Atl. 822 (1926); Matter of Ivie, 4 N.Y.2d 178,
149 N.E.2d 725, 173 N.Y.S.2d 293; In re Tiffany's Est., 157 Misc. 873, 285 N.Y.
Supp. 971 (1935).
73 E.g., profit-sharing trust, Estate of Furst, 27 Misc. 2d 589, 213 N.Y.S.2d
266 (1961); will of another, Matter of Fowles, 222 N.Y. 222, 118 N.E. 611(1918); Estate of Freund, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 7, 1962, p. 12.
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to a revocable, amendable trust which had been amended after
execution of the will so as to affect the disposition provisions
would be invalid,74 as would a pour-over to a trust created by the
testator after the execution of the wil. r 5 In both such cases, how-
ever, the execution of a codicil after the last dispositive amend-
ment or after the execution of the trust, would validate the
pour-over by eliminating the possibility of a violation of the
purpose of the wills statutes.70 It is interesting to note that the
decisions under this test appear to presuppose that administra-
tively the pour-over provision merely adds assets to the inter
vivos trust; it does not create a separate testamentary one.77
Such a test then would put an end to the reigning confusion on
that point.
This writer believes then that to the extent the above analysis
is correct, these two jurisdictions have evolved the best solution
to the pour-over problem. They have eliminated the pragmatic
and theoretical difficulties encountered in the application of acts
of independent significance, while at the same time compensating
for the inadequacies of incorporation by reference.
74 President & Directors of Manhattan Co. v. Janowitz, 260 App. Div. 174,
21 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1940).75 Clark v. Citizens Natl Bank, 38 N.J. Super. 69, 118 A.2d 108 (Ch. Div.
1955).
(976 Cf. Matter of Ivie, 4 N.Y.2d 178, 149 N.E.2d 725, 173 N.Y.S.2d 293
(158); In re Snyder's Will, 125 N.Y.S.2d 459 (1953); In re Tiffany's Est., 157
Misc. 873, 285 N.Y. Supp. 971 (1935); In re Bremer's Will, 156 Misc. 160, 281
N.Y. Supp. 264 (1935).
77 Matter of Rausch, 258 N.Y. 327, 179 N.E. 755 (1932); In re Waterbury's
Trust, 35 Misc. 2d 723, 231 N.Y.S.2d 208 (1962); 1 Nossaman, Trust Administra-
tion and Taxation, § 105 at 105-6 (Ist ed. 1945).
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